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THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF THE LOUISIANA
CONSTITUTION OF 1974: THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
AND CIViL LIBERTIES
INTRODUCTION
Unlike the United States Constitution, the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974 sets forth the rights of the people in the body of the document
itself. This form illustrates the relationship of civil rights to the con-
stitution and was best characterized by Francis Delperee when speaking
of the Belgian Constitution of 1831:
[The Constitution] does not set out civil rights ... by a pre-
amble, that sort of literary piece which comes before the con-
stitutional text. No, it is in the very body of the constitution
itself, among other maybe more technical articles, that Belgium
[and Louisiana] declares the human rights it intends to protect.
Of course, this is not only a matter of form or of external
presentation. By inscribing civil rights among its provisions, the
constitution has double effect. First of all, it gives to human
rights an unquestionable legal value. It is not literature, cate-
chism, or a program of civics; it is law, good law, real law,
law which creates legal duties for the citizens as well as for the
government. Furthermore, the constitution brings its techniques
and controls to the service of human rights; it appoints judges
who will have to see to the protection of the rights that are
proclaimed. The constitutional machine works at the service of
human rights.'
The architecture of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 is such that the
Declaration of Rights is not merely one of many articles comprising the
document. Indeed, the Declaration of Rights' place is one of prominence
as the first article, article I. The principles of the Declaration, as well
as its place in the overall design of the constitution, establish it as the
very foundation of the constitutional system of our present state gov-
ernment. The Louisiana Supreme Court in interpreting the Declaration
of Rights of the Constitution of 1974 has maintained a tradition of
guaranteeing expanded rights and civil liberties to the citizens of Louis-
Copyright 1991, by LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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iana.2 This tradition is of unparalleled significance in light of the in-
creasingly conservative decisions echoing from the United States Supreme
Court. In fact, since the 1974 constitution was adopted, Louisiana has
experienced, along with numerous other states, an unprecedented ex-
pansion of civil liberties protected under its state constitution.
The Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 1974 traces much
of the language found in the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights.
Indeed, terms and concepts such as equal protection, due process, free-
dom of speech, establishment of religion, and assistance of counsel are
found in both constitutions and are frequently interpreted similarly.
Many guarantees of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, however, have
been construed by the Louisiana Supreme Court to extend greater pro-
tection to civil rights than the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights.
In Guidry v. Roberts,3 Justice Tate noted that:
As the plaintiff contends, the individual rights guaranteed by
our state constitution's declaration of individual rights (Article
I) represent more specific protections of the individual against
governmental power than those found in the federal constitu-
tion's bill of rights, and they represent broader protection of
the individual.4
2. This tradition is an old one as noted by Judge John Minor Wisdom in his remarks
before the Louisiana Supreme Court on September 14, 1990:
Some of you may not know that in 1836 the Louisiana Supreme Court had
before it substantially the same issue that the United States Supreme Court
mishandled in Dred Scott fv. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)]. In Marie Louise,
Free Woman of Color v. Marot[, 9 La. 473 (1836)], the principal issue, over-
simplifying it, was whether a slave who had been taken to a free country,
France, on returning to her home in Louisiana, reverted to her status as a
slave. Was she only property or was she a free citizen? George Mathews, author
of the opinion, was the Presiding Judge of our Supreme Court .... His opinion
starts out with a short and simple declarative sentence: "This is a suit for
freedom." It concludes: "Being free for one moment in France, it was not in
the power of her former owner to reduce her again to slavery."
Judge Wisdom's remarks are published at 38 La. B.J. 238 (December 1990).
3. 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
4. Id. at 448. Justice Summers, long recognized as judicially conservative, in his
dissenting opinion in Guidry specifically enumerated what he considered to be the expanded
rights:
Rights secured to Louisiana. citizens under the Constitution of 1974 are far
broader and more definitely articulated than corresponding rights in the Federal
Constitution. Examples of this are found in such guarantees as the secret ballot
(Art. XI, § 2), the right to individual liberty (Art. 1, § 3), the right to property
(Art. 1, § 4), the right to privacy (Art. 1, § 5), freedom of expression (Art.
I, § 7), and the right of assembly and petition (Art. I, § 9). And the constitution
commands the government to hold these rights inviolate. (Art. I, § 1).
Id. at 452.
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The very nature of a state constitution is a limitation on the powers
of government.' Unlike the grants of power found in the United States
Constitution, state constitutions instead provide limitations on the oth-
erwise plenary power of the people of a state exercised through its
legislative body. 6 Generally, notwithstanding any law enacted to enforce
the guarantees of a constitution, the guarantees therein are self-exe-
cuting.'
In recognizing expanded rights under the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, the Louisiana Supreme Court has taken three approaches. The
first and most obvious method is to construe language found in the
Louisiana Constitution of 1974 but absent from the federal constitution
as an intentional grant of greater rights. This is illustrated by decisions
regarding the "invasion of privacy clause" of section 5 as applied in
civil and criminal cases' and the "excessive" punishments clause of
section 20.9 The second method is to construe language which is similar
or identical to federal provisions in a manner which expands civil liberty
protections independently of federal jurisprudence. This method is used
in certain decisions regarding the due process clause of section 2, and
the equal protection clause of section 3. The final manner in which
expanded rights are established under the Declaration of Rights is to
recognize certain provisions therein as codifying, if you will, high wa-
termarks under the federal jurisprudence in effect at the time of the
drafting and ratification of the 1974 constitution. These high watermarks
consist of expansive federal jurisprudence based upon the United States
Constitution which is incorporated into the language and scope of these
state constitutional provisions. Examples of these provisions include
decisions involving section 13 governing the rights of the accused and
Miranda warnings 0 and those involving civil privacy rights under section
5 and Griswold v. Connecticut" and its progeny.' 2
5. State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So. 2d 211 (1943).
6. Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975).
7. Couguenham v. Avoca Drainage Dist., 130 La. 323, 57 So. 989 (1912); Orleans
Parish School Board v. City of New Orleans, 56 So. 2d 280 (La. App. Orl. 1952); cf.
Hargrave, Developments in the Law, 1976-1977, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 38 La. L.
Rev. 438, 441-45 (1978).
8. Hondroulis v. Schuhmaker, 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989) (on rehearing); State v.
Hernandez, 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
9. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
10. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
11. 381 U.S. 479, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
12. In expanding rights under their constitutions, state supreme courts must be careful
to insulate their decisions from review by the United States Supreme Court. While common
sense and general principles of law recognize that a state supreme court is the final arbiter
of state constitutional provisions, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
constitutionally it is barred from reviewing a decision of the state supreme court on
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This article addresses the state of civil liberties under the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 as pronounced by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
It also introduces expansive guarantees found in the state constitution
which have remained vastly unexplored territories. In a rush to vindicate
civil rights, attorneys sometimes rush their clients into federal court
under the mistaken notion that somehow the state courts are inadequate
to protect constitutional rights, or that the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
section 1983, is the only means of vindicating civil rights. This is simply
not true. In fact, many times our state constitution provides broader
rights that are generally not assertable in federal court. 3 Failure of an
attorney to consider and weigh prosection of state civil liberties claims,
in light of the increasingly conservative federal judiciary, may result in
serious detriment to the client and exposure of the attorney to potential
malpractice claims. With new emphasis being placed on state constitu-
tional guarantees, it is critical to consider state constitutional provisions
before entering the courtroom. The state constitutional provisions are
set out in the order in which they appear.' 4
interpretations of state constitutional and statutory provisions. Louisiana ex rel. Francis
v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 67 S. Ct. 374 (1947); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 47
S. Ct. 103 (1926). However, in insulating decisions from review, the Court requires that
state supreme courts must articulate clearly that their decisions rest on state constitutional
grounds. In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), the Court reviewed
a decision by the Michigan Supreme Court that a search and seizure was in violation of
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, § 11 of the Michigan
Constitution. Therein, the Court stated the rule by which review of decisions based on
state constitutions would be precluded:
If a state court chooses merely to rely on federal precedents as it would on
the precedents of all other jurisdictions, then it need only make clear by a plain
statement in its judgment or opinion that the federal cases are being used only
for the purpose of guidance, and do not themselves compel the result that the
court has reached. In this way, both justice and judicial administration will be
greatly improved. If the state court decision indicated clearly and expressly that
it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds,
we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.
Id. at 1041, 103 S. Ct. at 3476. As Justice Marshall explains in the opinion by the Court,
this rule was adopted because of the "unsatisfactory and intrusive" practice of requesting
clarifications from the state courts of the grounds upon which their decisions were made.
Failure of the state courts to use the "plain statement" rule will result in review by the
U.S. Supreme Court and undoubtedly more holdings similar to Michigan v. Long, where
"[it appears . .. that the state court 'felt compelled by what it understood to be federal
constitutional considerations to construe ... its own law in the manner it did."' Id. at
1044, 103 S. Ct. at 3478.
13. Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
14. The following provisions of the Declaration of Rights are not covered herein:
La. Const. art. 1, § 6 (Freedom from Intrusion): This is the functional equivalent of
the third amendment to the United States Constitution, and has never been interpreted
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DuE PROCESS: ARTICLE 1, SECTION 2
Section 2. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, except by due process of law.
Under the Warren Court, the due process clause of the United States
Constitution, Amendment 14, was expanded to cover rights not solely
procedural. Due process took on "substantive" characteristics as well. 5
The Louisiana Supreme Court defined substantive due process as "the
constitutional guaranty that no person shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his life, liberty, or property. The essence of substantive due process is
protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action."1 6 The framers of
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 included as the first major enumerated
right a due process clause modeled after the federal constitutional pro-
vision. Aware of developments in the jurisprudence under the Warren
Court, the framers of the 1974 constitution sought to protect this new
since the adoption of the 1974 Constitution.
La. Const. art. 1, § 9 (Right of Assembly and Petition), § 12 (Freedom of Discrimi-
nation), § 16 (Right to a Fair Trial), § 17 (Jury Trial in Criminal Cases), § 19 (Right
to Judicial Review), § 21 (Writ of Habeas Corpus), § 23 (Prohibited Laws): These provisions
have all been basically subsumed in the corresponding federal guarantees and as such
have little if any independent meaning.
La. Const. art. 1, § 10 (Right to Vote): This provision is basically subsumed in the
guarantees of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 (1981), 1973 (1981 and
West Supp. 1990). To the extent that there may be greater rights than those guaranteed
by the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, see Comment, Voting
and Election Law in the Louisiana Constitution, 46 La. L. Rev. 1253 (1986).
La. Const. art. 1, § 14 (Right to Preliminary Examination), § 15 (Initiation of Pros-
ecution), § 18 (Right to Bail): These provisions are basic criminal procedures which have
been elevated to constitutional protection. The principles embraced by these provisions
have generally been utilized in criminal procedure in Louisiana and while their elevation
to constitutional status is new, their basic substance is not.
Finally, La. Const. art. 1, § 24 (Unenumerated Rights): This provision, similar to the
ninth amendment of the United States Constitution, has not received much attention at
all. Consider the following quote by the supreme court in State v. McCarroll, 70 So. 448
(La. 1915), as regards the source provision, article 15 of the Constitution of 1913: .'This
enumeration of rights shall not be construed to deny or impair other rights of the people
not herein expressed.' This article is meaningless, as the people of this state retain all
rights the exercise of which is not prohibited by the Constitution of the state or of the
United States."
15. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509, 81 S. Ct. 1752, 1759 (1961), (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
16. Babineaux v. Judiciary Commission, 341 So. 2d 396, 400 (La. 1976). The court
also defined procedural due process: "Procedural due process requires that all proceedings
directed toward the deprivation of life, liberty, or property be conducted in a manner
consistent with essential fairness., Among the requirements are notice of the proceeding
and a fair opportunity to defend." Id. Both of these definitions rested on federal inter-
pretations of the federal due process.
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expansion of due process into the substantive realm of civil liberties. 17
The Louisiana Supreme Court has generally remained true to the intent
of the framers. However, much of the analysis of due process under
state law merely parrots federal due process interpretations. The problem
arises now when federal jurisprudence begins to distinguish and even
recede from the expansions of due process reached by the Warren
Court."
In three notable cases, however, Louisiana's due process analysis
has diverged from federal due process analysis. In State In Interest of
Dino,'9 the supreme court held that the state constitutional guarantees
of due process and equal protection "require that juveniles not be
permitted to waive their constitutional rights on their own." 2  This
decision was clearly contrary to numerous other jurisdictions which
allowed juveniles to waive the privilege against self-incrimination without
running afoul of the federal due process guarantees. 21 The court found
that due to the large percentage of juveniles who are incapable of
understanding or intelligently waiving their constitutional rights, coupled
with the general policy of the laws of Louisiana to protect a minor
from the consequences of his immaturity, the state due process clause,
as well as section 13 (rights of the accused) mandated that a juvenile
could not waive his constitutional rights without benefit of advice from
counsel or an informed parent. The court also extended state due process
to require a public trial when a juvenile is adjudicated a delinquent
based upon acts that would constitute a crime if engaged in by an adult,
holding then Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1579(B) unconstitutional.'"
At the time Dino was decided, the federal courts were not yet with-
drawing from the requirements of Miranda and federal due process
concerns. 23 Additionally, no prior major decision by a Louisiana court
17. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts 1001; Hargrave, Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974,
35 La. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1974).
18. See, e.g., Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986); Flagg Bros.,
Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
19. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
20. Id. at 594. The court in fact relied upon § 2 (due process), § 3 (equal protection),
§ 13 (Rights of the Accused), and § 16 (Right Against Self-incrimination).
21. Id. at 593.
22. Repealed by 1978 La. Acts No. 172, § 5. The court stopped just short of declaring
that the state due process clause required a trial by jury. Id. Justices Dennis, Calogero,
and Dixon would have held that the state constitutional right to trial by jury and the
prohibition against arbitrary age discrimination would have granted juveniles the right to
a trial by jury. Id. at 602.
23. The prosecution argued that Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711
(1977), modified the rule in Miranda v. Arizona. While this proposition was rejected by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, later U.S. Supreme Court opinions would definitely recede
from the principles established in Miranda, e.g., Allen, 478 U.S. 364, 106 S. Ct. 2988,
and Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
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distinguished state from federal due process. However, Dino clearly does
not rest on federal concerns, but on an intentional expansion of state
due process and equal protection. u
In the case of Wilson v. City of New Orleans,2 the supreme court
had an opportunity to discuss the due process clause as it applied to
the practice of the New Orleans Police Department of immobilizing
vehicles with numerous parking violations. The court, however, failed
to significantly address due process concerns under the state constitution.
Only once in the whole decision was the state constitutional provision
noted: "Due process of law is guaranteed by both the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution and Art. 1, section 2 of the
1974 Louisiana Constitution. ' 26 Nevertheless, the court did embark on
a thorough discussion of federal interpretations of the due process clause,
but without indicating whether the decision rested on a violation of state
constitutional guarantees. While the ultimate holding of the decision is
that the city's "booting" practice violated due process under both con-
stitutions, the opinion linked state due process to federal due process,
thus making it susceptible to review by the United States Supreme Court.
Later supreme court opinions, however, cite Wilson for the departure
of interpretation of the state due process clause from the federal one.27
In In re Adoption of B.G.S. ,28 the supreme court was careful to
render its decision squarely on state constitutional guarantees. In this
case, the court had the opportunity to consider Louisiana Revised Sta-
tutes 9:422.13, "The Putative Father Statute", and Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:422.8(B), concerning adoptions when the father's name is not
indicated on the birth certificate. The court held that the statute's
provisions authorizing singularly the mother of the illegitimate child
(where the father's name did not appear on the birth certificate) to
place the child for adoption, thus terminating all parental rights "what-
soever," including the rights of the unwed father, was an unconstitutional
exercise of state power in setting the procedures for adoption. In holding
the two statutes unconstitutional, the court relied on article 1, section
2 exclusively. As in Wilson, the court relied heavily upon federal in-
terpretations of due process, but was careful to articulate its decision
solely on state constitutional grounds:
In interpreting our own state constitution, of course, we are not
bound by this balancing approach. This test was almost certainly
24. For additional discussions of State in Interest of Dino, see Note, A Cautious
Step Forward, 39 La. L. Rev. 278 (1978) and Lamonica, Work of the Appellate Courts
for the 1977-78 Term, Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 39 La. L. Rev. 917 (1979).
25. 479 So. 2d 891 (La. 1985).
26. Id. at 894.
27. See, e.g., In re B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990).
28. 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990).
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not specifically intended by the framers who had drafted our
constitution some three years before Mathews v. Eldridge ...
was decided, and there is no indication that the framers intended
for our state's constitutional guarantees to fluctuate with the
vicissitudes of federal constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless,
we have employed this balancing test in deciding what procedure
is due under the state due process clause, see Wilson v. City
of New Orleans, supra, and we will continue to do so as long
as its application promotes the goals of that safeguard. 29
In rendering its decision solely on state law, the court was concerned
with recent developments in the United States Supreme Court, especially
Michael H. v. Gerald D.,10 where a plurality concluded a state could
not be compelled under the due process clause to recognize the parent-
child relationship between a biological father and a child even if there
was a developed relationship, where the husband of the mother sought
to raise the child in the traditional family unit. Under the facts of In
re B.G.S., the Louisiana Supreme Court was concerned that because
there was insufficient time for an established relationship to arise between
the unwed father and the child, federal due process would require a
developed relationship before the father would have a fundamental liberty
interest in rearing his child.3' The court found that none was necessarily
required, but refused to gamble their decision on a review by the
increasingly conservative United States Supreme Court.
The supreme court's expansions of due process in Dino, Wilson,
and In re B.G.S. represent differences not in the approach to due process
analysis, but in the significance accorded the interests of the individual
versus the state. State due process concerns, like the federal counterpart,
are determined by a balancing approach whereby the rights of the
individual are given greater weight than in federal due process deter-
minations. Thus, the difference in what is considered arbitrary or un-
reasonable under the state and federal due process clauses depends upon
the heightened expectations attributed to the individual as balanced
against the competing goals of the state.3 2
29. Id. at 552.
30. 491 U.S. 110, 109 S. Ct. 2333, rehearing denied, 110 S. Ct. 22 (1989).
31. While Michael H. v. Gerald D. was the most recent of the parental rights cases
decided by the United States Supreme Court, the requirement of paternity plus a developed
relationship between parent and child was established earlier. See, e.g., Caban v. Mo-
hammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
32. See Hargrave, Louisiana Constitutional Law: Work of Appellate Courts for the
1977-1978 Term, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 39 La. L. Rev. 807, 813-17 (1979).
Professor Hargrave notes several cases decided by the Louisiana Supreme Court finding
a violation of substantive due process where the federal courts might not, and further
discusses the possible abuses of subjective application of substantive due process, as is
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In retrospect, the Louisiana Supreme Court generally has not given
independent meaning to due process under the state constitution, resulting
in section 2 being essentially a truism. Due process under the state
constitution has no independent significance since only violations of
federal due process result in violations of state due process. In many
opinions, the court's declaration of violations of state due process are
dicta, inasmuch as they are decided on federal due process grounds as
well with no reference to state jurisprudence to support the supreme
court's interpretations or standards reflected in section 2.11 The absence
of state jurisprudence construing the state due process clause is especially
disconcerting in light of the presence of a due process clause in Louisiana
constitutions starting with the Constitution of 1898 to the present one.
Whether Wilson and In re B.G.S. are the exceptions or the trend in
expanded state due process analysis remains to be seen. The failure of
the Louisiana Supreme Court otherwise to give section 2 any independent
meaning will undoubtedly, as noted by Justice Dennis in the court's
opinion in In re B.G.S., result in fluctuations of state due process
analysis similar to that found in decisions regarding the federal due
process clause. With the vast number of opinions relying upon due
process analysis, a failure of the supreme court to continue the inde-
pendent extensions of state due process under Dino, Wilson, and In re
found in current state and federal due process analysis. An interesting example of this
is found in the pre.1974 Constitution case of Kennedy v. Item Co., Inc., 213 La. 347,
34 So. 2d 886 (1948), wherein the plaintiffs asserted an action for libel against a newspaper
on the ground that their reputation had been damaged. The Louisiana Supreme Court
found that our state constitution, then the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, protected an
individual's reputation, equating it to a "liberty interest" necessary to our pursuit of
happiness. The contrary result was reached by the United States Supreme Court in Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976), which held that federal due process does
not protect an individual's reputation. It is likely that Kennedy will remain the law under
the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, protected by the state due process clause of § 2.
33. See Connick v. Lucky Pierre's, 331 So. 2d 431, 434 (La. 1976) ("The fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as article I, section 2 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974, command that words and phrases used in statutes be not so vague
and indefinite that any 'penalty' prescribed for their violation constitutes the taking of
liberty or property without due process of law"); State v. Shreveport News Agency, Inc.,
287 So. 2d 464, 470 (La. 1973) (Obscenity statute is overboard, too general,' and not
specific enough to "withstand the constitutional attack under the United States Consti-
tution, First and Fourteenth Amendments, and our Constitution Article 1, Sections 2 and
3"); Theriot v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 436 So. 2d 515, 520 (La. 1983) ("The
substantive guarantee of due process in the federal and state constitutions requires only
that the legislation have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest"); State v.
Griffin, 495 So. 2d 1306, 1310 (La. 1986) (In holding that La. R.S. 14:90.2, prohibiting
gambling in public, was not constitutionally infirm, the court stated, "to suggest in this
context that Louisiana's constitution may provide greater due process rights than the
federal constitution appears completely erroneous" in light of prohibition of Art. 12, §
6 against gambling).
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B.G.S. will undoubtedly result in due process rising and falling with
the tide of the Court in Washington, not New Orleans.
EQUAL PROTECTION: ARTICLE I, § 3
Section 3. No person shall be denied the equal protection of
the laws. No law shall discriminate against a person because of
race or religious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a
person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition,
or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude
are prohibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime.
I
Much like the due process clause of section 2, the equal protection
guarantee of article 1, section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974
was generally interpreted by the Louisiana Supreme Court to be merely
a restatement of the equal protection clause of the United States Con-
stitution, amendment 14.14
Like state due process expansions, state equal protection under sec-
tion 3 has taken on some independent meaning. As early as Burmaster
v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2,31 Justice Dennis in his concurrence
questioned the reliance of the majority upon the proposition that the
state equal protection clause was merely a mirror image of federal equal
protection.36 Even Justice Summers noted in his dissent in Guidry v.
Roberts that section 3 was one of the rights "far broader and more
definitely articulated" than corresponding rights in the federal consti-
tution.37
However, the most significant decision on state equal protection is
Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,3" which
involved an equal protection challenge to the statutory cap of $500,000.00
on medical malpractice awards.39 In deciding to remand the case on the
issue of whether the state can demonstrate that the statute at issue
substantially furthers a legitimate state objective, the supreme court
abandoned traditional federal equal protection analysis, stating "the
34. State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist.
No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1978), appeal after remand, 448 So. 2d 162 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1984); Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980) (On challenge under state
and federal equal protection, succession articles discriminating against illegitimates held
violative of state and federal constitutions, using federal equal protection analysis).
35. 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1978).
36. Id. at 1388.
37. 335 So. 2d 438, 452 (La. 1976).
38. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985), on remand, 490 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
writ denied, 496 So. 2d 325 (1986).
39. La. R.S. 40:1299.39 (1977).
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federal three level system is in disarray and has failed to provide a
theoretically sound framework for constitutional adjudication." Instead,
the court found, when the classification is one of the enumerated classes
against which section 3 prohibits discrimination, state equal protection
guarantees mandate a different test:
We conclude that (1) the federal multilevel system is not an
appropriate model for interpreting and applying the protection
of equal laws pledged by our state constitution; (2) when a law
classifying individuals on the basis of physical condition is at-
tacked, the proponent of the legislation must show that the law
does not arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate
against the disadvantaged class by demonstrating that the leg-
islative classification substantially furthers a legitimate state ob-
jective .4
Under the analysis in Sibley, the strict scrutiny test would be aban-
doned in favor of an absolute ban on all laws relating to race and
religious beliefs; the intermediate scrutiny test would give way to a
requirement that the state prove that the law is not arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonably related to a legitimate state objective; and minimal
scrutiny, commonly referred to as "rational relationship," gives way to
a requirement that the opponent of the legislation show that it does
not suitably further any appropriate state interest. Other suspect classes
and fundamental rights not enumerated will continue to be protected
by the strict scrutiny test of the fourteenth amendment. Under the Sibley
test of equal protection, these persons and rights will be protected by
an inquiry whether there is "an appropriate governmental interest
suitably furthered" by the governmental action in question....
40. Id. at 1107. Compare Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762, 777-78, 97 S. Ct. 1459, 1468-69 (1977), wherein Justice Rehnquist attacks
the Court's application of equal protection analysis:
[The approach of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting equal pro-
tection has] produced a syndrome wherein this Court seems to regard the Equal
Protection Clause as a cat-o'-nine-tails to be kept in the judicial closet as a
threat to legislatures which may, in the view of the judiciary, get out of hand
and pass "arbitrary," "illogical," or "unreasonable" laws. Except in the area
of the law in which the Framers obviously meant it to apply-classifications
based on race or on national origin, the first cousin of race-the Court's decisions
can fairly be described as an endless tinkering with legislative judgments, a series
of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle.
The Civil War Amendments did not make this Court into a council of revision,
and they did not confer upon this Court any authority to nullify state laws
which were merely felt to be inimical to the Court's notion of the public interest.
41. 477 So. 2d at 1104.
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Judicial attention would be focused on the merits of a case and
not diverted toward abstract questions. By removing the blinders
imposed by a priori categories, the court would naturally focus
upon governmental and individual interests, resulting in a more
precise and reliable evaluation of constitutional questions.4 2
The continued expansion of a new and improved section 3, however,
was short-lived. In Crier v. Whitecloud 3 the plaintiff challenged the
three year preemptive period for medical malpractice, Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:5628. The court, in finding that the statute does not create
an impermissible classification under section 3, held that, absent any
showing by the plaintiff, the statute would withstand an equal protection
challenge. In doing so, the court undercut its holding in Sibley, under
certain circumstances deferring for all practical purposes to whatever
laws are passed by the legislature. The court noted that
if a law classifies individuals on a basis outside the scope of
art. 1, § 3, it will be upheld unless a member of the disad-
vantaged class shows that it does not suitably further any ap-
propriate state interest .... A remand to the district court to
afford plaintiff the opportunity to present evidence to carry her
burden would serve no useful purpose because of the minimal
level of scrutiny involved and the apparent state interest furthered
by the statute."
While the court in Crier did not rely upon the federal jurisprudence
in its holding, it interpreted the lowest level of Sibley scrutiny to be
the same "rational relationship" test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in cases such as City of New Orleans v. Dukes.45 Justice
Dennis, dissenting in Crier, stated that this "judicial scrutiny is in reality
non-existent." Justice Dennis instead advocates an interpretation of our
state equal protection clause with its own minimal standards:
In Sibley ... this court recognized for the first time that Article
I, § 3 of the 1974 Constitution raises the threshold of equal
protection and rejected the federal three level standard. In place
of the minimal level of federal protection, under which judicial
scrutiny is in reality non-existent, our constitution establishes its
own minimal standard: when a law classifies individuals on any
basis, it shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged
class shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate
state interest."
42. Id. at 1107.
43. 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986).
44. Id. at 310-11.
45. 427 U.S. 297, 96 S. Ct. 2513 (1976).
46. 496 So. 2d at 313.
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The confusion over the correct application of burdens of proof and
levels of scrutiny in equal protection analysis has led to much conflict
in the jurisprudence. In Kirk v. State,7 the court stepped back from
the Crier application and apparently applied the Sibley analysis to declare
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:322.1 unconstitutional and violative of the
equal protection rights of criminals. 48 The court, finding Kirk did not
fit into any enumerated class, applied the minimum level of scrutiny
under Sibley. While there is obviously a "rational relationship" between
the statute and the goal of arming prosecutors with evidentiary advan-
tages, the court must have found no "appropriate" governmental in-
terest, as the claim of the statute being fundamentally unfair is one of
due process, not equal protection.49
RIGHT TO PROPERTY: ARTICLE I, § 4
Section 4. Every person has the right to acquire, own, control,
use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right
is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable
exercise of the police power.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its
political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just
compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity
authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and nec-
essary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner;
in such proceedingg, whether the purpose is public and necessary
shall be a judicial question. In every expropriation, a party has
the right to trial by jury to determine compensation, and the
owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss. No
business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the
purpose of operating that enterprise or halting competition with
a government enterprise. However, a municipality may expro-
priate a utility within its jurisdiction. Personal effects, other
than contraband, shall never be taken.
[Personal effects shall never be taken. But the following
property may be forfeited and disposed of in a civil proceeding,
as provided by law: contraband drugs; property derived in whole
47. 526 So. 2d 223 (La. 1988).
48. La. R.S. 14:322.1 (Supp. 1990) provides that no person can record confidential
conversations without the consent of all parties. This statute was not applied to the state
which had merely to seek the consent of one party to the conversation.
49. For further discussions of Sibley equal protection see Comment, Equal Protec-
tion-The Louisiana Experience in Departing from Generally Accepted Federal Analysis,
49 La. L. Rev. 903 (1989).
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or in part from contraband drugs; property used in the distri-
bution, transfer, sale, felony possession, manufacture, or trans-
portation of contraband drugs; property furnished or intended
to be furnished in exchange for contraband drugs; property used
or intended to be used to facilitate any of the above conduct;
or other property because the above described property has been
rendered unavailable.,PO
This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property
necessary for levee and levee drainage purposes.
Unlike the guarantees of due process and equal protection, the court
has traditionally had little problem finding that this section was intended
to give "far-reaching new protection" to the right of citizens to own
and control private property. In the federal Constitution, property is
protected by virtue of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments. In Louisiana however, the constitutional right to private
property extends further than mere due process guarantees against ar-
bitrary deprivations of property; it protects the right to own property
itself.5
In State v. 1971 Green GMC Van 5 2 defendants in two consolidated
cases sought to have the state seizure/forfeiture statute53 declared un-
constitutional as a violation of state and federal due process. Both trial
courts found the act unconstitutional under state and federal due process;
in addition, one of the trial courts rendered its decision based upon the
guarantee of a right to property under section 4. The supreme court
found that due process was violated, but found as an independent ground
that section 4 was violated as well:
Article I, section four of our Constitution was intended to give
"far reaching new protection" to the right of citizens to own
and control private property. [Citations omitted.] Its language
goes beyond other state constitutions, including our 1921 Con-
stitution, and the federal constitution in limiting the power of
government to regulate private property.
5 4
50. La. Const. art. I, § 4. Paragraph 2 was added by Acts 1989, no. 840, § 1,
approved Oct. 7, 1989, effective Nov. 6, 1989; it replaces the last sentence of paragraph
two, which formerly read, "Personal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken."
51. In the Constitution of 1921, the protection of property upon which this provision
was modeled was a simple clause found in article 1, § 2: "No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law. Except as otherwise provided
in this Constitution, private property shall not be taken or damaged except for public
purposes and after just and adequate compensation is paid."
52. 354 So. 2d 479 (La. 1977).
53. La. R.S. 40:989 (1972).
54. 354 So. 2d at 486.
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In holding the forfeiture statute constitutionally infirm, the court noted
that section 4 required, at a minimum, a criminal conviction prior to
forfeiture, and that the constitutional exception did not include derivative
contraband.
The court revisited section 4 in State v. Manual." Therein, the court
again addressed the constitutionality of the state forfeiture statute.- The
court in holding the forfeiture statute a valid exercise of state power
withdrew from its requirement under section 4 that a conviction be had
prior to forfeiture and extended the exception to derivative contraband.
The court noted, however, that the proceeding was quasi-criminal in
nature. Further, the court's opinion was based on cases from the federal
Courts of Appeal, which had never construed a provision similar to
that contained in section 4.
In an attempt to breathe life into State v. 1971 GMC Green Van,
the court addressed this issue again in State v. Spooner.57 In this case,
under a revamped forfeiture statute, the court once again based its
decision on violations of due process and section 4.18 In chastising the
lower court for relying almost entirely on federal jurisprudence, the
court in a footnote stated:
The appellate court passed too quickly over Manual in its effort
to derive a rule of law from federal jurisprudence....
Because we hold that the due process and private property
protections embodied in the Louisiana Constitution forbid any
approach which would relieve the state of the burden of proving
the grounds which support forfeiture, we do not follow the
federal approach, which essentially places the burden of proof
on the claimant after a minimal showing by the government.5 9
Justice Calogero, writing for the majority, rejected the reliance by
Manual on federal jurisprudence, returning to the greater property rights
of section 4 and 1971 Green Van. However, the court did not recant
its withdrawal from the requirement that there be a conviction prior to
forfeiture, or the extension of the exception to derivative contraband.
This past year the people of Louisiana amended section 4 to provide:
Personal effects shall never be taken. But the following property
may be forfeited and disposed of in a civil proceeding, as
55. 426 So. 2d 140 (La. 1983).
56. La. R.S. 32:1550 (1981).
57. 520 So. 2d 336 (La. 1988).
58. The statute in Spooner, La. R.S. 32:1550(A)(7)(c) (1983), provided a presumption
that material found in close proximity to controlled dangerous substances or manufacturing
or distributing paraphernalia is contraband, and this presumption can only be rebutted
by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
59. 520 So. 2d at 345, 347 n.8.
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provided by law: contraband drugs; property derived in whole
or in part from contraband drugs; property used in the distri-
bution, transfer, sale, felony possession, manufacture, or trans-
portation of contraband drugs; property furnished or intended
to be furnished in exchange for contraband drugs; property used
or intended to be used to facilitate any of the above conduct;
or other property because the above described property has been
rendered unavailable.60
While the court has not had opportunity to consider this new amendment,
this provision clearly intends to put to rest once and for all whether
derivative contraband can be forfeited under section 4. Additionally, it
overrules State v. Spooner and earlier cases to the extent that they
declare forfeiture proceedings quasi-criminal in nature, and constitu-
tionally preempts prior judicial interpretations to the contrary. By re-
defining the forfeiture proceeding as civil in nature, it allows the legislature
to define the burden of proof and, at a minimum, reduce that burden
to a preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to the clear and con-
vincing evidentiary standard used under ordinary forfeiture proceedings.
Of course, the courts may interpret the general policy behind section 4
to require the state to prove the applicability of the forfeiture statutes
by a clear and convincing showing, even in a civil proceeding, due to
the fact that forfeiture is an exception to the prohibition against taking
property.6'
RIGHT TO PRIVACY: ARTICLE I, § 5
Section 5. Every person shall be secure in his person, property,
communications, houses, papers, and effects against unreason-
able searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. No warrant shall
issue without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, the persons
or things to be seized, and the lawful purpose or reason for
the search. Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure
conducted in violation of this Section shall have standing to
raise its illegality in the appropriate court.
60. La. Const. art. I, § 4.
61. An example of other jurisprudentially created burdens of proof heightened for
policy reasons include the requirement that the incapacity of a testator be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1984). This standard
may be reduced now in light of the repeal of La. Civ. Code art. 1492, allowing evidence
of hatred, anger, suggestion, or captation. See Spaht, The New Forced Heirship Legislation:
A Regrettable "Revolution," 50 La. L. Rev. 409, 466-67 (1990). While the policy behind
a heightened burden of proof for deprivation of property is constitutional in origin, the
supreme court would in fact be hard pressed to find otherwise if the Legislature statutorily
provides the burden of proof.
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Section 5 is the state counterpart to the fourth amendment to the
United States Constitution. Section 5 embraces not only guarantees
against unreasonable criminal searches but extensions of civil privacy
rights. This was a conscious choice on the part of the framers. 62 But
these expanded rights would mean nothing without the Louisiana Su-
preme Court upholding this distinction in its decisions. Not only has
the court done so, but it has also used the grant of greater rights to
extend constitutional rights in spite of United States Supreme Court
decisions reducing the scope of the fourth amendment.
STATE-ACTION SEARCHES
In a series of cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld the
original intent of the framers of the Louisiana constitution to effect
greater protection to Louisiana citizens, beginning with the case of State
v. Kinnemann.63 In Kinnemann, the court held that because section 5
applied to "invasions of privacy," it made no difference if the searches
were subsequent to an "arrest" or "in plain view"; either search must
be made upon probable cause. While not laying out the parameters of
the rights protected by section 5,.the court noted that at a minimum
it included the right discussed by Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States:"
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness .... They conferred, as
against the government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
In the pre-1974 constitution case of State v. Roach,65 in what amounted
to no more than dicta, the court noted that had the acts which the
defendant Roach sought to have suppressed occurred after the effective
date of the Constitution of 1974, she would have been empowered under
the standing clause of section 5 to challenge the evidence seized illegally.66
In analyzing the provisions of the 1974 constitution (which were found
to be inapplicable to the Roach facts), the court stated, "This provision
purposefully differs from the prevailing federal rule, which limited the
62. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts 1072-1077.
63. 337 So. 2d 441 (La. 1976).
64. 277 U.S. 438, 478, 48 S. Ct. 564, 572 (1928).
65. 338 So. 2d 621 (La. 1976).
66. In the companion case of State v. Saia, 302 So. 2d 869 (La. 1974), Saia's arrest,
which gave the officers probable cause to break into Roach's residence, was unconsti-
tutional. The court, in upholding Roach's conviction, held that she didn't have standing
to challenge the evidence illegally seized from Saia.
1991]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ability to assert the unconstitutionality of a search and seizure to the
individual whose person or property was unlawfully searched."67
In State v. Williams,68 the court departed from the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Pennsylvania v. Mimms69 and Foley v.
Connelie.70 Williams was a passenger in an automobile stopped for a
traffic violation. The police officer ordered both the driver and Williams
out of the vehicle. In doing so, the police officer was able to observe
a sawed-off shotgun on the floor between the passenger's side of the
front seat and the door. The prosecution argued that the recent United
States Supreme Court decision in Mimms allowed such a stop as a
reasonable search/seizure. In Mimms, the Court held that a policeman
may order a driver to get out of his car incident to an ordinary traffic
stop. The rationale was that the state's interest in the protection of the
safety of the police officer was a legitimate and overriding justification,
thus not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. The Williams court,
Justice Dixon writing, questioned the application of Mimms to section
5 and the facts of Williams. Nonetheless, he held that, to the extent
that Mimms might be held to apply, greater rights were afforded under
section 5:
In addition, the treatment by the Supreme Court of the intrusion
into the driver's personal liberty is not dispositive of the issue
at hand. As the court noted, by stopping the automobile the
police have decided that the driver will be detained. Such is not
the case for the passenger, who has broken no law and who
may walk away from the scene unless the police officer has
some other legitimate reason to detain him. Certainly the pas-
senger has a higher expectation of privacy than the driver,
because the passenger plays no part in the routine traffic in-
fraction and has reason to suppose that any exchange with the
authorities will be conducted by the driver alone. To give the
police officer the discretion to order the passenger from the
automobile without requiring any explanation of the officer's
actions (other than a blanket concern for personal safety in all
situations) is to abandon the requirement of individualized in-
quiry into the reason for an intrusion of the right of privacy
secured by Article 1, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution. 71
The court went on to hold that regardless of the relationship of Mimms
to the guarantees of section 5, the Mimms rationale did not extend to
67. 338 So. 2d at 623.
68. 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978).
69. 434 U.S. 106, 98 S. Ct. 330 (1977).
70. 435 U.S. 291, 98 S. Ct. 1067 (1978).
71. 366 So. 2d at 1374.
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passengers in the automobile. It further found that there are no grounds
under the 1974 constitution for a rule that "would permit police to
remove a passenger from an automobile on a routine traffic stop." '72
The foremost pronouncement on the relationship between the fourth
amendment and section 5 is State v. Hernandez.71 Once again the Louis-
iana Supreme Court departed from a United States Supreme Court
holding; this time New York v. Belton.7 4 In Hernandez, the defendant
was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The arrest, however, did not
take place until the defendant had parked his car in his driveway. Upon
being taken to the station, Hernandez left specific instructions that no
one was to drive his car. The police towed the car anyway, alleging
that it was office policy. In preparing the car to be towed, a police
officer found contraband drugs, and Hernandez was subsequently charged
with possession of illegal substances. The prosecution argued that Belton
authorized the search of the automobile and any containers therein
incident to the lawful arrest. In rejecting this, the Louisiana Supreme
Court noted that once the vehicle was at the defendant's residence and
was not a safety hazard, there could be no justification for its seizure
incident to an arrest without some other legal basis doing so. Once
again the court held that the United States Supreme Court rule was not
applicable, but even if it was, section 5 granted greater rights:
Furthermore, the search of the defendant's automobile, without
probable cause, and in the absence of any of the circumstances
which have been recognized by this court as justifying a narrow
exception to the warrant requirement, plainly constituted an
unreasonable search, seizure or invasion of privacy in violation
of Article 1, § 5 of the 1974 Constitution. Although the Belton
case is distinguishable and therefore inapplicable here, it should
be noted that we do not consider it to be a correct rule of
police conduct under our state constitution. We, of course, give
careful consideration to the United States Supreme court inter-
pretation of relevant provisions of the federal constitution, but
we cannot and should not allow those decisions to replace our
independent judgment in construing the constitution adopted by
the people of Louisiana. Our state constitution's declaration of
the right to privacy contains an affirmative establishment of a
right of privacy, explicit protections against unreasonable searches,
seizures or invasions of property and communications, as well
as houses, papers and effects, and gives standing to any person
adversely affected by a violation of these safeguards to raise
72. Id.
73. 410 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1982).
74. 453 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 2860 (1981).
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the illegality in the courts .... This constitutional declaration
of right is not a duplicate of the Fourth Amendment or merely
coextensive with it; it is one of the most conspicuous instances
in which our citizens have chosen a higher standard of individual
liberty than that afforded by the jurisprudence interpreting the
federal constitution.5
In one of the bolder moves of judicial fiat, the court, in an opinion
by Justice Blanche, reversed itself in State v. Reeves, 76 holding on
rehearing that warrantless consensual (by one party) electronic surveil-
lance does not violate section 5. In doing so, Justice Blanche relied
heavily upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United
States," thus returning to a dependence on federal jurisprudence. On
original hearing, in an opinion by Justice Dennis, the court had held
the exact opposite relying principally on convention transcripts, Justice
Dennis' personal experience as a delegate of the constitutional conven-
tion, and ratifier's intent. In concurring in the rehearing opinion, Justice
Lemmon instead deferred to the legislature's interpretation of the con-
stitution:
The fact that the members of the legislative branch approved
such procedure only six years after the adoption of the Con-
stitution certainly indicated that those elected representatives of
the people did not believe such action to be an unreasonable
invasion of the privacy of a person's communications. In en-
acting Act 241 of 1980, the Legislature must have construed the
Louisiana constitution protection as intended to be coextensive
with the United States Supreme Court's assessment of Fourth
Amendment protections clearly expressed in Katz and White,
rather than as intended to be a rejection of White.78
Justice Dennis criticized the majority's opinion on rehearing as being
an anomaly in the court's pronouncements thus far on section 5:
I am shocked by the methodology and the results of their
opinion....
Like a blindfolded Houdini, the majority opinion
writer eludes uncontradicted convention history, wiggles
75. 410 So. 2d at 1385.
76. 427 So. 2d 403 (La. 1982).
77. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967)
78. 427 So. 2d at 419 (footnotes omitted). In all fairness, Justice Lemmon is referring
to the fact that many of the legislators present in the Legislature at the time the statute
was passed were also delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1973. However, this
author questions the amount of deference given to the whole of the Legislature. The
Legislature cannot be equated with the drafters, nor do their actions reflect the intent of
the ratifiers which is arguably more important.
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free of plain words in the constitution and discovers a
gap in the document no other scholar knew existed, to
find, after all, that, whenever this court wishes, private
communications can be seized or intercepted without a
warrant and without probable cause supported by oath
or affirmation. 9
In Kirk v. State,8° the court had an opportunity to reconsider State
v. Reeves. Plaintiff Kirk and his attorney successfully brought suit for
a declaratory judgment in the district court that Louisiana Revised
Statutes 14:322.1 which prohibited lay persons from recording confi-
dential communications with witnesses, while allowing the prosecution
to engage in this activity, was unconstitutional as violative of equal
protection. Since State v. Reeves had previously held that the prosection
could record witnesses without violating section 5 and the right to
privacy, the propriety of that decision was again raised. However, instead
of finding that the statute was violative' of privacy rights, the court
rested its decision solely on violations of state equal protection guarantees
inasmuch as the statute did not further any "appropriate" state interest.
Justice Dennis, in concurring, noted the inconsistency in the holding of
Kirk with that of Reeves, urging that while the majority reached the
correct conclusion it was for the wrong reasons. In chastising the majority
for not readdressing the issue in Reeves of section 5 privacy, Justice
Dennis remarked:
We now have taken several benighted steps down the totalitarian
road. Because of this court's misinterpretation of the right to
privacy article in Reeves, we allow state officials to electronically
eavesdrop at will, without probable cause, and without warrants,
on our citizen's private communications. At the same time, as
the present case demonstrates, we have created a situation in
which it is now impossible for the legislature to enact laws
protecting citizens from unlimited electronic surveillance by other
private citizens. Sadly and ironically, this Orwellian scenario is
happening in a state whose constitution is one of the few which
specifically purports to protect "communications" from unrea-
sonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.8 '
The DWI roadblock cases also illustrate the departure of the Louis-
iana Supreme Court from federal jurisprudence. In two cases, State v.
Parms,2 and State v. Church, 3 the court struck down arbitrarily based
79. 427 So. 2d at 421, 427.
80. 526 So. 2d 223 (La. 1988).
81. 526 So. 2d at 227-28.
82. 523 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1988).
83. 538 So. 2d 993 (La. 1989).
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DWI road blocks as a violation of section 5. In State v. Parms, the
court, Justice Watson writing, found that discretionary roadblocks were
violative of both the fourth amendment and section 5. In State v. Church,
the court had opportunity to reconsider DWI roadblocks. Justice Watson,
again writing for the majority, pretermitted the question of the validity
of the stops under the federal constitution, and declared the roadblocks
violative of section 5. He noted that the court in Parms relied on federal
constitutional grounds to invalidate the roadblocks, and that the state-
ment in Parms that the placement of roadblocks would not pass state
constitutional muster was only dicta. In seeking to clarify the court's
position, Justice Watson clearly established that Church's invalidation
of roadblocks rested solely on state constitutional grounds. In contrast,
shortly thereafter the United States Supreme Court, in Michigan De-
partment of State Police v. Sitz," approved surprise sobriety checkpoints,
thus holding that the fourth amendment of the federal constitution was
not violated.
It is interesting to note that Justice Cole in his dissent to State v.
Church questioned whether section 5 was actually any broader than the
fourth amendment. In opposition to the holding of the court, Justice
Cole noted:
As regards the question of whether the Louisiana Constitution
is broader than the United States Constitution relative to Fourth
Amendment principles, I concur in the conclusion of Justice
Blanche in his dissent to State v. Hernandez... : "However, if
the Louisiana [constitution] is, in fact, broader than the United
States Constitution on that issue, this writer feels that the Con-
stitution is due for an amendatory change in the opposite di-
rection.8"
The latest pronouncement by the court on the issue of violations
of section 5 privacy rights occurred in Moresi v. State, Department of
Wildlife.86 Plaintiffs were arrested by wildlife agents for failure to tag
game properly. The agents subsequently posted a note on the door of
plaintiffs' camp stating, "We missed you this time but look out next
time!" The note was allegedly meant for another camp. Plaintiffs brought
an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 for violation of their civil rights
and an action under state law for money damages for violation of
section 5. The court rejected the claims under section 1983, but found
that money damages can be awarded for violations of the state con-
stitution. While recognizing the action, however, the court adopted the
84. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
85. 538 So. 2d at 1001.
86. 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990).
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good faith defense that is available in section 1983 actions. 7 The court,
citing Butz v. Economou,88 noted that:
We consider here, as we did in Scheuer [v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232 (1974)] the need to protect officials who are required to
exercise their discretion and the related public interest in en-
couraging the vigorous exercise of official authority. Yet Scheuer
and other cases have recognized that it is not unfair to hold
liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside
the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly established
limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise of official
judgment.8 9
The court ultimately found the good faith defense to be applicable in
Moresi.
It is interesting to note that the standing provision of section 5 to
challenge unconstitutionally seized evidence is, by its very language, much
broader than the federal jurisprudential requirements. The intricacies of
the standing provisions are not jurisprudential creations of the Louisiana
Supreme Court, and so are not treated herein. It should be noted,
however, that one question left to be answered by the supreme court
is whether there is implicit in section 5 an exclusionary rule or whether,
like its federal counterpart, it is a creature of the courts subject to
modification as needed.9
PRIVATE PARTY SEARCHES
In State v. Hutchinson,91 the court considered section 5 in light of
private actors. The court found that the defendant did have a consti-
tutional right to privacy which was capable of being violated by third
parties, though under the particular facts of this case no violation had
occurred:
Defendant contends, however, that the inspection conducted by
Duson was an unreasonable search proscribed by the Louisiana
Constitution. We are unwilling to hold that the rights safe-
87. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S. Ct. 1213 (1967).
88. 438 U.S. 478, 98 S. Ct. 2894 (1978).
89. 1990 La. Lexis at 39.
90. State v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), on
remand, 330 So. 2d 900 (La. 1976). For further discussion see Lamonica, Work of the
Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term, Pre-Trial Criminal Procedure, 37 La. L. Rev.
535 (1977); Comment, The Exclusion of Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence and Why
the Louisiana Supreme Court Should Reject United States v. Leon on Independent State
Grounds, 51 La. L. Rev. 861 (1991).
91. 349 So. 2d 1252 (La. 1977). The case involved a motion to quash evidence which
was found attached to the underside of the defendant's vehicle by the victim of a robbery.
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guarded by Article I, § 5 of our Constitution are merely co-
extensive with those protected by the Fourth Amendment to the
federal constitution, or that private searches and seizures are
not within the ambit of protection afforded by our state charter.9
Chief Justice Sanders, concurring in the result, disagreed with Justice
Dennis' statement that the right to privacy guaranteed in section 5
protected individuals from private actors. Indeed, Justice Sanders in-
terprets the phrase "invasions of privacy" to be merely descriptive of
the entirety of rights protected by section 5:
I find nothing in the language of this section extending the
protection to searches by private citizens. In fact, the language
is the same as that of the Fourth Amendment with the exception
of the addition of the words "invasion of privacy" and the last
sentence dealing with standing.
The reference to invasions of privacy does nothing more
than make clear that the right protected is that of privacy. This
right has long been recognized as the basis of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
93
In State v. Nelson,94 the supreme court again addressed private actors
and section 5. In Nelson, the defendant allegedly swallowed a diamond
ring shown to him by a store clerk. Private security guards were sum-
moned who subsequently took the defendant to an upstairs room where
he was strip searched, handcuffed, and choked to prevent his swallowing
what the guards believed was the ring in his mouth. The court found
that this was an unreasonable search which violated section 5. The court
further noted that while the search as performed by private persons was
unreasonable, the search was conducted pursuant to state law. 95 This
was also the result in State v. Longlois,96 where arrest bf a defendant
for simple possession of marijuana was made by a wildlife agent in
violation of section 5 but under color of state law. However, it should
be noted that both Nelson and Longlois involved searches where the
private actors were acting under authority of state law, one as a security
guard, the other as a wildlife agent. Since neither was acting solely in
his capacity as a private citizen, these decisions do not compel a finding
92. Id. at 1254.
93. Id. at 1255. For others agreeing with Justice Sanders' proposition see Comment,
The Status of Private Searches Under the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 49 La. L. Rev.
873 (1989).
94. 354 So. 2d 540 (La. 1978).
95. La. Code Crim. P. art. 215 allows merchants to use reasonable force to detain
for questioning suspected shoplifters, where there is reasonable cause to believe the person
committed a theft of merchandise.
96. 374 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1979).
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that section 5 applies to private actors, as the court could have found
sufficient state action to otherwise invoke the protections of section 5.
Inasmuch as these cases could have rested on violations of section 5 by
state actors, they can be distinguished from the case of completely private
actors.
However, State v. McCabe9 involved a search by a private party
and not under authority of state law. In McCabe, the defendant, who
was apparently intoxicated in a neighborhood with which he was un-
familiar, was cursing and engaging in altercations. A neighbor, whose
children were playing in the yard near the home that the defendant was
visiting and who was concerned about the defendant's actions, looked
inside the defendant's truck and found a loaded pistol, whiskey, and
contraband drugs. This evidence was subsequently used by the prose-
cution against the defendant. In failing to find a violation of section
5, the court noted an exception to suppression of evidence when a
private party is involved:
We find this search was reasonable and that any privacy interest
which defendant may have had was subordinated to Hall's [the
neighbor's] concern for the safety and welfare of his children.
In support of this position, we find that courts have fre-
quently held that evidence obtained by a private search is ad-
missible where a superior right or interest attached to the
individual conducting the search at that time or place. 98
CrIVI PRIVACY RIGHTS
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in two notable cases, has recognized
that the right to be free from invasions of privacy extends beyond
criminal matters. In Arseneaux v. Arseneaux,9 a husband sued his wife
for a divorce on the grounds that she had committed adultery, evidenced
by an alleged abortion. The court found that the wife could not be
compelled to disclose evidence of an abortion allegedly obtained by her
during the existence of the marriage. In doing so, the court held that
to force her to disclose this information would violate her right to
privacy as recognized under the federal jurisprudence and the safeguards
of section 5:
Not only is the trial court's interpretation of the statute [the
Physician-Patient Privilege, La. R.S. 13: 37341 correct, but there
are strong constitutional considerations [article I, § 5] weighing
against admission of this evidence.... Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
97. 383 So. 2d 380 (La. 1980).
98. Id. at 383.
99. 428 So. 2d 427 (La. 1983).
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113 . . . (1973) recognized a constitutional right to privacy con-
cerning abortion in the early stages of pregnancy. Planned Par-
enthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth ... held that a woman is
protected from husbandly as well as governmental intrusion in
deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy. This constitutional
right to privacy is not absolute but can only yield to a compelling
state interest .... No compelling state interest requires an in-
vasion of the right to privacy here.10
In the context of informed consent, the supreme court in Hondroulis
v. Schuhmaker °" further extended the right to be free from invasions
of privacy beyond criminal matters. What started out as a simple medical
malpractice-informed consent case, ended up being one of the more
controversial decisions to come out of the court on privacy matters.
The court on rehearing recognized a constitutional right based upon
section 5 to obtain or reject medical treatment, including the right to
be fully informed of all material risks:
Art. I, Section 5 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution expressly
guarantees that every person shall be secure in his person against
unreasonable "invasions of privacy." This safeguard was in-
tended to establish an affirmative right to privacy impacting
non-criminal areas of law and establishing the principles of the
supreme court decision in explicit statement instead of depending
on analogical development. 0 2
The opinion seems to indicate the court's willingness to subsume the
federal guarantees of privacy emanating from the constitutional rationale
of Roe v. Wade'03 and progeny. The interesting part of this expansion
is that while Roe was decided prior to the 1974 constitution, the principle
case upon which the court relies is Carey v. Population Services Inter-
national,1' 4 which was not decided until 1977. In light of Webster v.
Reproductive Services'05 then pending before the United States Supreme
Court, and the possibility of its abandoning the privacy rights established
in Roe v. Wade and relied upon in Carey v. Populations Services, the
supreme court may have attempted to cement the privacy rationale of
Roe and its progeny into the law of Louisiana by virtue of section 5.' °0
100. Id. at 430.
101. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1989).
102. Id. at 415.
103. 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
104. 431 U.S. 678, 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
105. 489 U.S. 1076, 109 S. Ct. 1525 (1989).
106. This author is careful to note that the privacy rights of Roe do not necessarily
compel a finding of a right to abort. If the U.S. Supreme Court were to pull back from
Roe, the Louisiana Supreme Court could very well find that the fetus is a person under
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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: ARTICLE I, § 7
Section 7. No law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech
or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish his
sentiments on any subject, but is responsible for abuse of that
freedom.
The guarantee of freedom of expression is widely interpreted in the
federal jurisprudence, a fact widely recognized in the convention de-
bates. 10 As such, there has been little necessity by the Louisiana Supreme
Court to interpret the 1974 constitution's guarantee more broadly. The
inclination has generally been to find that the state constitutional guar-
antee protects the same types of expression that the federal constitution
does. However, there seemed to be some concern by the convention
delegates to preserve the federal high watermark in effect in 1974 as
Louisiana's standard in section 7.' °0
The supreme court in Mashburn v. Collins'09 recognized that the
guarantees of section 7 need not necessarily be limited to the minimal
guarantees of the federal constitution. However, the court in Mashburn
declined to extend the guarantees at that time, finding that the guarantees
of both constitutions sufficiently protected the defendant. For purposes
of obscenity, the court in State v. Waldenbooks"° made no distinction
between federal and state constitutional guarantees of free press and
expression. And, in the case of a journalist's constitutional privilege
against compulsory disclosure of sources, the court in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Ridenhour)"' found the state and federal guarantees to be
equivalent: "For purposes of this issue, we will consider the two con-
stitutions together. The information is either protected by both or not
protected by either.""12
our constitution whose subsequent rights are in juxtaposition to those of the mother and
thereby not extend the right to abort, while preserving the rights to privacy espoused
therein. In re B.G.S. 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990). As to whether or not the court will in
fact use Arseneaux and Hondroulis to extend privacy rights under § 5 to the "right" of
abortion on the state level is a prediction which this author does not care to make. Cf.
Devlin, Developments in the Law, 1989-90, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 51 La. L. Rev.
295, 303 (1990). For considerations of sexual privacy under § 5, see Comment, The
Louisiana Constitution's Declaration of Rights: Post-Hardwick Protection for Sexual Pri-
vacy?, 62 Tul. L. Rev. 767 (1988).
107. VI Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: Convention
Transcripts 1105-1109.
108. Id. at 1106.
109. 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977).
110. 386 So. 2d 342 (La. 1980).
111. 520 So. 2d 372 (La. 1988).
112. Id. at 374 n.10.
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION: ARTICLE I, § 8
Section 8. No law shall be enacted respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
Section 8 tracks the language of the first part of the second sentence
of article 1, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921. 1 The
drafters of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, however, were very
careful to leave out the additional language of section 4, as well as
certain prohibitions in the old constitution which forbade public funding
of private and sectarian schools." 4 Arguably, the Constitution of 1974
reduces state constitutional barriers between the church and state; how-
ever, very little litigation has arisen under new section 8 guaranteeing
the right to free exercise of religion. The latest definitive pronouncement
on the subject arose under the Constitution of 1921 in Seegers v.
Parker.' 5 The court therein held that article 1, section 4 of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1921 embodied the federal guarantees of freedom of
religion found in the first amendment to the United States Constitution.
The court further intimated that perhaps the inclusion of the federal
guarantee, as it embodies the separation of church and state, was in-
corporated much more comprehensively, and certainly "in greater detail"
than the federal guarantees found in the first amendment. The effects
of section 8 on state assistance to private religious schools has not been
demonstrated. However, as far as other non-educational concerns are
involved, there is no reason to believe that Seegers will not be applied
to the 1974 Constitution.
RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: ARTICLE I, § 11
Section 11. The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms
shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the
passage of laws to prohibit the carrying of weapons concealed
on the person.
The provisions of section 11 are more expansive than the second
amendment to the United States Constitution. Unlike the federal right,
113. Section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provides:
Every person has the natural right to worship God according to the dictates of
his own conscience. No law shall be passed respecting an establishment of
religion, nor prohibiting the free exercise thereof; nor shall any preference ever
be given to, nor any discrimination- made against, any church, sect or creed of
religion, or of any form of religious faith or worship.
114. Article 12, § 13 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 provided in part: "No
appropriation of public funds shall be made to any private or sectarian school."
115. 256 La. 1039, 241 So. 2d 213 (1970).
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which inures to the benefit of the state," 6 the provisions of section 11
inure to the benefit of the individual citizens of Louisiana." 7 There are,
however, two definite limitations to section 11. In State v. Amos,", the
supreme court held that the right of each citizen to bear arms could
be limited to exclude people convicted of certain crimes:
The right to keep and bear arms, like other rights guaranteed
by our state constitution, is not absolute. We have recognized
that such rights may be regulated in order to protect the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare so long as that reg-
ulation is a reasonable one. It is beyond question that the statute
challenged in the instant case was passed in the interest of the
public and as an exercise of the police power vested in the
legislature. Its purpose is to limit the possession of firearms by
persons who, by their past commission of certain specified se-
rious felonies, have demonstrated a dangerous disregard for the
law and present a potential threat of further or future criminal
activity.'9
The second limitation involves federal preemption of this right. In
an Attorney General opinion it was noted that this right may be pre-
empted by the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970 20 to the extent that
the state provision might allow convicted felons the right to bear arms. 2'
RIoHTs OF ACCUSED: ARTICLE 1, § 13
Section 13. When any person has been arrested or detained in
connection with the investigation or commission of any offense,
he shall be advised fully of the reason for his arrest or detention,
his right to remain silent, his right against self incrimination,
his right to the assistance of counsel and, if indigent, his right
to court appointed counsel. In a criminal prosecution, an accused
shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. At each stage of the proceedings, every person is
entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice, or appointed by
the court if he is indigent and charged with an offense punishable
by imprisonment. The legislature shall provide for a uniform
system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for in-
digents.
116. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
117. State v. Hamlin, 497 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1986).
118. 343 So. 2d 166 (La. 1977).
119. Id. at 168 (citations omitted).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1988).
121. Op. Atty Gen. No. 76-122 (April 29, 1976).
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The "rights of the accused" is a field dominated by federal juris-
prudence, waxing in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Miranda v. Arizona,122 the holding of which was adopted by the very
language of section 13. The most notable decision on section 13 has
been State in Interest of Dino.2 3 In Dino, the supreme court specifically
held that adoption of section 13 in the 1974 constitution "enhanced
and incorporated the prophylactic rules of Miranda v. Arizona."'' 24 The
prosecution argued that Oregon v. Mathiasonl2l modified Miranda and,
in doing so, section 13. The court, addressing this concern, stated:
[Ihf Mathiason represents a constriction of the Miranda definition
of significant deprivation of freedom of action, its holding clearly
does not govern our interpretation of Article I, § 13 of the
1974 Louisiana Constitution whose framers intended to adopt
the Miranda edicts full-blown and unfettered. [Footnote omit-
ted.] Finally, it appears that, in fact, there was an intention by
the convention to go beyond Miranda and to require more of
the State regarding the precise issue now under discussion . 26
This is the best example of jurisprudential recognition that a federal
high watermark was made the standard for Louisiana by the language
of the Constitution of 1974, section 13, and it will serve to protect the
rights of the criminally accused long after the United States Supreme
Court has lessened the protections once thought to be afforded by the
Bill of Rights.
HUmAE TREATMENT: ARTICLE I, § 20
Section 20. No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to
torture, or to cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights
of citizenship shall be restored upon termination of state and
federal supervision following conviction of any offense.
In State v. Sepulvado 27 the court construed the "excessive" provision
of section 20 to provide greater protection than the eighth amendment
to the United States Constitution. Justice Tate, writing for the majority,
stated that:
The deliberate inclusion of a prohibition against "excessive" as
well as "cruel and unusual" punishment adds an additional
constitutional dimension to judicial imposition and review of
122. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
123. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
124. Id. at 589.
125. 429 U.S. 492, 99 S. Ct. 711 (1977).
126. 359 So. 2d at 590. The issue to which Justice Dennis refers is the taking of
statements from the accused without an attorney being present.
127. 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
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sentences ...
The Eighth Amendment of the federal constitution prohibits
"cruel and unusual" punishments. It was long ago held that
excessiveness was a factor to be considered in determining whether
a punishment was within the constitutional prohibition of that
clause. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544,
54 L.Ed. 793 (1910). However, later cases gradually subsumed
the excessiveness element with the other, more literal tests for
determining whether the "cruel and unusual" standard was vi-
olated, giving rise to a general rule against review for excess-
iveness per se. 128
Justice Tate also noted that while federal Courts of Appeal had
developed methods of reviewing the record for excessiveness of sentences,
the federal jurisprudence has not incorporated excessiveness in the eighth
amendment prohibition, nor extended the eighth amendment to the states
through the fourteenth amendment.
In State v. Thomas,129 the court summed up the jurisprudence of
what comprised excessive punishment:
A sentence is unconstitutionally excessive when it is grossly out
of proportion to the severity of the offense or inflicts unnecessary
pain and suffering. State v. Reed, 409 So.2d 266 (La. 1982).
A sentence within the statutory range may be excessive when
considered in light of the individual defendant and the circum-
stances of his crime. State v. Quiebedeaux, 424 So.2d 1009 (La.
1982); State v. Grey, 408 So.2d 1239 (La. 1982); State v. Se-
pulvado, supra.130
AccEss TO CouRTs: ARTICLE 1, § 22
Section 22. All courts shall be open, and every person shall
have an adequate remedy by due process of law and justice,
administered without denial, partiality, or unreasonably delay,
for injury to him in his person, property, reputation, or other
rights.
This section is particularly problematic. The majority of opinions
rendered under this section have concentrated on the access to the
courts. 3 ' However, the opinions consistently found that the guarantee
128. Id. at 764-65 (footnote omitted).
129. 447 So. 2d 1053 (La. 1984).
130. Id. at 1056.
131. Crier v. Whitecloud, 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors,
477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985), on original hearing; and Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d
475 (La. 1981).
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of access to the courts was substantially the same right protected by
the guarantees of procedural due process embodied in section 2. In a
notable instance in which section 22 miglit actually have been violated,
Justice Dennis intimated in his dissent in Crier v. Whitecloud'3 2 that
open access to the courts might be violated by very short preemptive
periods such as the one established for medical malpractice, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 9:5628.111
Justice Dixon, also dissenting in Crier, noted a violation of section
22 inasmuch as a "statute which allows prescription to run before a
tort victim knows or should know that he has been damaged, violated
the 'adequate remedy' required by Art. I, § 22."' 1 However, it was in
Williams v. Kushner' that Chief Justice Dixon, again in a dissent,
discussed section 22 and the requirement'of "adequate remedy" exten-
sively. In advocating the position that the medical malpractice cap was
unconstitutional, he rejected prior jurisprudence which equated section
22 solely with due process. Accompanied by an analysis of the history
and scope of section 22, especially the guarantee of an adequate remedy,
Justice Dixon noted:
The history of Article 1, § 22 indicates that the protection
afforded by this provision encompasses more than the mere right
of access to the courts, as suggested in some of our prior
decisions. [Footnote omitted.] "Adequate remedy" and "due
process" do not mean the same thing; "adequate remedy" is
more than "due process.' 13 6
132. 496 So. 2d at 314.
133. In addition, I have serious reservations regarding whether the statutory limitation
period, as applied to minors, violates their access to courts. The Supreme Court
of Missouri recently struck down such a statutory provision on this basis stating:
The statutory limitation period, as applied to minors, violates their right
of access to our courts under Mo. Const. art. I, § 14 and renders vacant
the guarantee contained in this constitutional provision which declares in
no uncertain terms "that the courts of justice shall be open to every
person and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person .... "
To the extent that it deprives minor medical malpractice claimants of the
right to assert their own claims individually, makes them dependent on
the actions of others to assert their claims, and works a forfeiture of
those claims if not asserted within two years, the provisions of § 516.105
are too severe an interference with a minor's state constitutionally enu-
merated right of access to the courts to be justified by the state's interest
in remedying a perceived medical malpractice crisis. Strahler v. St. Luke's
Hospital, 706 S.W.2d 7, 11-12 (Mo. 1986) (footnote omitted).
In my opinion the Missouri Court's reasoning has a great deal of merit.
Id. at 314.
134. Id. at 313.
135. 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989).
136. Id. at 309.
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This is the only substantial interpretation, however, offered by a member
of the court which recognized any deviation of the guarantees of section
22 from section 2, due process.
CONCLUSION
The Louisiana Declaration of Rights is an extensive codex of liberties,
not all of which are unique and independent. Very few times does one
see a challenge under due process that does not also raise the issue of
equal protection. Nor does one usually raise a right to property under
section 4 without raising a correlative question of due process of law.
All in all, the Louisiana Supreme Court cannot be faulted for its frequent
reliance on federal jurisprudence. For many years, the most extensive
guarantees of rights were those arising from the application of the Bill
of Rights to the states. However, with the waning of civil liberties and
waxing of judicial conservatism in the United States Supreme Court,
the Louisiana Supreme Court is called upon to protect the civil rights
of our citizens via the 1974 constitution. While the 1974 constitution
was intended to be abbreviated, our Declaration of Rights is substantially
longer than the Bill of Rights. In adopting the, 1974 constitution the
people of Louisiana sought to maintain for themselves those basic rights
inalienable to all persons. The constitution mandates that "[the rights
enumerated in this Article are inalienable by the state and shall be
preserved inviolated by the state."'13 7 Only through a continued trend
of expansion of state constitutional guarantees can we weather the
conservative storm in Washington.
The purpose of this article is best summed up by retired United
States Supreme Court Justice William Brennan:
The essential point I am making, of course, is not that the
United States Supreme Court is necessarily wrong in its inter-
pretation of the federal Constitution, or that ultimate consti-
tutional truths invariably come prepackaged in the dissents,
including my own, from decisions of the Court. It is simply
that the decisions of the Court are not, and should not be,
dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counter-
part provisions of state law. Accordingly, such decisions are not
mechanically applicable to state law issues, and state court judges
and the members of the bar seriously err if they so treat them.
Rather, state court judges, and also practitioners, do well to
scrutinize constitutional decisions by federal courts, for only if
they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned,
paying due regard to precedent and the policies underlying spe-
137. La. Const. art. I, § 1.
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cific constitutional guarantees, may they properly claim persua-
sive weight as guideposts when interpreting counterpart state
guarantees. I suggest to the bar that, although in the past it
might have been safe for counsel to raise only federal consti-
tutional issues in state courts, plainly it would be most unwise
these days not also to raise the state constitutional questions. 3 '
Richard P. Bullock
138. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 502 (1977) (footnote omitted).
